Epistemic consequentialism, veritism, and scoring rules by Daoust, Marc-Kevin & Côté-Bouchard, Charles
 Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules
Marc-Kevin Daoust (Harvard University) and Charles Côté-Bouchard (Carleton
University).
Forthcoming in Erkenntnis. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-021-00426-5.
Abstract: We argue that there is a tension between two monistic claims that are the core of
recent work in epistemic consequentialism. The first is a form of monism about epistemic
value, commonly known as veritism: accuracy is the sole final objective to be promoted in
the epistemic domain. The other is a form of monism about a class of epistemic scoring
rules: that is, strictly proper scoring rules are the only legitimate measures of inaccuracy.
These two monisms, we argue, are in tension with each other. If only accuracy has final
epistemic value, then there are legitimate alternatives to strictly proper scoring rules. Our
argument relies on the way scoring rules are used in contexts where accuracy is rewarded,
such as education.
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Scores are everywhere. Students try to improve their SAT scores for getting into good
schools. When buying a house, you need a good credit score, and you might look for a
house with a good walking score. Insurance companies measure your health score and your
driving score.
According to many thinkers, scores also have their place in the evaluation of
doxastic states, such as full beliefs and credences (degrees of beliefs). This is a central tenet
in the veritistic epistemic consequentialist (VEC) research programme. According to VEC,
just like we can evaluate a house by giving it a walking score, we can, and should, evaluate
doxastic attitudes by giving them epistemic scores, i.e., a numbered measure of how well
the attitude performs relative to the sole final epistemic goal, namely truth or accuracy.
In this article, we raise a worry about the viability of a popular brand of VEC
(found, e.g., in Joyce 1998; 2009, Greaves and Wallace 2006, and Pettigrew 2016). In
general, when it comes to determining what scoring system(s) to use to evaluate a
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performance, there are two platitudes that need to be respected. First, which scoring
system(s) we should choose depends on which objective(s) we want to reward in evaluating
the relevant performances. Second, we should choose the scoring system(s) that best reward
the achievement of the objective(s) we want to reward. So, we need to determine both
which objective(s) we want to reward and which scoring system does the best job at
rewarding the objective(s).
We argue that these two platitudes reveal a tension within this brand of VEC. With
respect to the first platitude, VEC identifies accuracy as the sole final objective to reward in
the evaluation of credences. With respect to the second platitude, VEC typically identifies
strictly proper scoring rules (SPSR), like the Brier Score, as the sole legitimate way to
reward accuracy. At the core of this brand of VEC, then, are two types of monisms. One is
monism about epistemic value: there is not a plurality of final epistemic values. Accuracy is
the only final objective or goal in the epistemic domain. All other putative epistemic values
can only be instrumental to the final goal of accuracy. The other is monism about a class of
epistemic scoring rules: there is not a plurality of legitimate systems to measure how well a
doxastic state performs relative to the goal of accuracy. Only SPSR are legitimate epistemic
scoring rules.
We argue that these two monistic theses are in tension with each other. We begin by
highlighting that, in contexts where accuracy matters and is rewarded (like education), a
plurality of scoring rules is used. In education, whether a scoring rule is appropriate
depends on the specific objectives education specialists wish to reward. Of course,
education specialists want to reward accuracy. But depending on contextual factors, they
also want to reward other things, such as risk-aversion, risk-seeking, or reflection. These
additional objectives help them determine which scoring rule is appropriate.
Education, like veritistic consequentialist epistemology, gives a central place to
accuracy. However, the lesson from education is that accuracy is not enough to single out a
particular class of scoring rules. This lesson reveals a kind of dilemma in which VEC
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cannot have both monisms at the same time. On the one hand, if SPSR is the only
legitimate measure of inaccuracy, then there are, plausibly, other final epistemic values
besides accuracy. On the other hand, if accuracy really is the sole final epistemic value,
then on some occasions, the recourse to non-strict scoring rules is appropriate.
In Section 1, we clarify the two platitudes concerning scoring systems in contexts
where accuracy matters and is rewarded, like education. Drawing on these lessons, we
present our main argument in Section 2: we argue that VEC faces a challenge when it
comes to identifying scoring rules that reward the goal of accuracy. VEC is committed to
SPSR being the only legitimate system of epistemic scoring. Yet, some non-SPSR are
compatible with rewarding accuracy. So, VEC does not exclude scoring rules that are not
strictly proper. In Section 3, we consider some common epistemic arguments for SPSR. We
argue that those answers are unavailable to VEC, because they undermine veritism. In
Section 4, we consider a pragmatic justification for excluding non-SPSR as legitimate
epistemic scoring systems. This strategy also fails, we argue, because it does not generalize
to useful inaccurate credences and accurate credences that are practically detrimental or
pointless.
 1. Two Platitudes Concerning Scoring Systems
Our argument relies on two platitudes concerning scoring systems. We will begin by saying
a few words on these platitudes in contexts where accuracy matters and is rewarded, like
education.
Tom finds Sophie’s answer sheet to a geography test. Sophie underlined her
answers. They go as follows:
1. What is the capital of Belgium? a. Leuven b. Brussels c. Brugge
2. What is the capital of Canada? a. Toronto b. Montreal c. Ottawa
3. What is the capital of the United States? a. Washington b. Miami c. Scranton
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Tom knows that Sophie got the right answer to the first question, but got the wrong answer
to the second one. She did not answer the third question. He wonders: What is Sophie’s
score? In order to answer this question, Tom needs to know which scoring rule was used
for this test.
Scoring rules are functions. They map take an agent’s predictions, credences,
beliefs, and other doxastic states onto a real number, which represents the agent’s score.1
There is an infinite number of scoring rules. Some are relevant and useful. Others are
completely irrelevant. For instance, the following scoring rule is familiar:
Familiar Scoring Rule. For a test of n questions,
(1) If A gets the right answer to question i, give 1/n point to A;
(2) If A does not get the right answer to question i, give 0/n point to A.
But we could create a completely irrelevant scoring rule, such as:
Irrelevant Scoring Rule. For a test of n questions,
(1) If A gets the right answer to question i, give X points to A where X is the
number of moons that a randomly selected planet has;
(2) If A gets the wrong answer to question i, subtract Y points to A, where Y is the
number of blue whales currently in the gulf of Saint Lawrence.
Mathematically speaking, Sophie’s score could be anything. However, Tom knows
that teachers rarely measure their student’s scores with irrelevant scoring rules. So, there
must be a subset of scoring rules that are relevant, namely, one that rewards the
achievement of a valuable objective.
For education specialists, there are different relevant ways to assess a student’s
score, depending on which valuable objectives the teacher wishes to reward (Lesage,
Valcke, and Sabbe 2013; Budescu and Bar-Hillel 1993). Education specialists care about
accuracy, of course. Ceteris paribus, an answer sheet with all the good answers should get
1 With the exception of logarithmic rules—they allow for infinite scores.
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the best possible score, and an answer sheet with wrong answers only should get a bad
score. But the goal of accuracy leaves room for different scoring rules.
For instance, consider the Familiar Scoring Rule. This way of measuring a student’s
score makes no distinction between wrong answers and the absence of right answers. They
both get no point. So, making a guess dominates not answering the question, in the sense
that students are equal or worse off in every possible world when they do not make a guess
(Budescu and Bar-Hillel 1993, 278).
This means that the Familiar Scoring Rules rewards making guesses, even when one
has no clue what the right answer is. In some contexts, guessing and taking risks are
welcome. But in other contexts, risk-aversion is preferable. This is why some scoring rules
penalize wrong answers (Lesage, Valcke, and Sabbe 2013; Budescu and Bar-Hillel 1993).
Consider the following scoring rule:
Risk-Averse Scoring Rule. For a test of n questions,
(1) If A gets the right answer to question i, give 1/n point to A;
(2) If A does not get the right answer to question i, give 0/n point to A.
(3) If A gets the wrong answer to question i, subtract 1/n point to A.
As Lesage and al. (2013, 189) stress, this scoring rule “penalizes the student for
incorrect responses,” and is necessary for discouraging guesses. So, while the Familiar
Scoring Rule and the Risk-Averse Scoring Rule both aim at rewarding accuracy, they also
comprise secondary objectives, such as encouraging (or avoiding) guessing.
Some “confidence weighting” scoring rules reward self-reflection (Lesage, Valcke,
and Sabbe 2013, 190). Depending on how confident they are of their answers, students get
differentiated rewards and penalties for each question. For instance, suppose Sophie
indicates that she is extremely confident of her answer to question 1. Then, she could get
2/n point for a right answer, and -5/n points for a wrong one. These scoring rules encourage
students to “know what they know.” When students can distinguish their knowledge from
their ignorance, they can maximize their score by giving more weight to their knowledge.
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Context could explain why some scoring rules are preferable to others. For instance,
suppose you train doctors. We don’t want healthcare professionals to think that a wrong
answer is equivalent to no right answer. Accordingly, perhaps the Risk-Averse Scoring Rule
is preferable for training future doctors. Given that risk-taking is undesirable in healthcare,
this scoring rule could be more appropriate for them.
To make a long story short, there is no single way to measure scores. For education
specialists, here is how a scoring rule is identified:
1. First, we identify the valuable objectives (risk-seeking, risk-taking, self-reflection, etc.)
we want to reward.
2. Then, we identify the scoring system(s) that best rewards these valuable objectives.
Since Tom doesn’t know what Sophie’s teacher wants to reward, he cannot calculate
her score. Plausibly, her teacher wants to reward accuracy, but that is compatible with a vast
array of scoring rules.
 2. Scoring Rules and Veritistic Epistemic Consequentialism
Drawing on the lessons of Section 1, we now analyze the extent to which a veritistic
epistemic consequentialist can exclude scoring rules that are not strictly proper.
Suppose that Tom knows Sophie’s degrees of confidence in the following
propositions:
1. She is 80% confident that “Brussels is the capital of Belgium”;
2. She is 50% confident that “there is an even number of giant sequoias in Muir Woods”.
Tom knows the answers to these questions. This time, he wants to calculate Sophie’s
epistemic score. By epistemic score, we mean the kind of score veritistic epistemic
consequentialists are interested in. Given the platitudes outlined in the previous sections,
VEC thus needs to answer two questions:
1. First, which epistemic objective(s) do they want to reward?
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2. Second, which scoring system(s) best rewards these objectives?
 2.1 VEC and the platitudes
In general, epistemic consequentialism is the view that the epistemic ‘good’ is prior
to the epistemic ‘right’. That is, conduciveness to epistemic value determines what we
epistemically should believe, and what is epistemically justified and rational to believe;
epistemic norms are ultimately about promoting the final epistemic value or values.2
As already indicated, the most common form of epistemic consequentialism is
VEC, which takes truth or accuracy to be the sole final epistemic value to be promoted.
Given its commitment to veritism, VEC has a clear answer to the first question: accuracy is
the sole final epistemic objective to be rewarded by an epistemic scoring system. The
second question for VEC is therefore this: which epistemic scoring system(s) best reward(s)
accuracy?
Many veritistic consequentialists are committed to a particular answer. To see this,
note that for most veritistic consequentialists, an agent’s level of accuracy should be
measured with strictly proper scoring rules (SPSR). Scoring rules are proper if an agent
“maximizes the expected score for an observation drawn from the distribution F if he or she
issues the probabilistic forecast F, rather than G≠F” (Gneiting and Raftery 2007, 359). A
scoring rule is strictly proper if the reported probabilities are unique.3
Here is an example of how those measures work. Suppose the following
propositions are true:
1. Brussels is the capital of Belgium;
2. There is an even number of giant sequoias in Muir Woods.
3 Joyce (1998; 2009), Easwaran and Fitelson (2015), Pettigrew (2016), Konek and Levinstein (2017).
2 For more on epistemic consequentialism in general, see Dunn (2015) and Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn (2018).
For criticisms, see Littlejohn (2012; 2015), Berker (2013), and Greaves (2013).
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Suppose Sophie has credences in such propositions. Using SPSR, we can measure how
inaccurate her credences are. Take the Brier score. When Sophie assigns a credence X in4 5
P, her Brier score is measured by the following:
Brier Score:
Suppose A has a credence of X in P. If P is true, the agent’s score is (1-X)2. If P is
false, the agent’s score is X2.
The lower Sarah’s Brier score is, the better she is from the point of view of accuracy. So,
suppose that Sarah has a credence of 0.8 in (1) and a credence in 0.5 in (2). Then, if these
propositions are true, her score would be (1-0.8)2 + (1-0.5)2.
Given the goal of accuracy, SPSR are legitimate reward structures. First, they entail
that a perfectly omniscient agent (e.g., with perfectly accurate credences) should get the
best possible score. Second, they entail that an agent with credences of 0 in true
propositions, and credences of 1 in false propositions, should get the worst possible score.
Third, they entail that, all things being equal, an agent who raises his or her credence in a
true proposition gets a better score (and, conversely, an agent who lowers his or her
credence in a false proposition gets a worse score).6
For many veritistic consequentialists, SPSR are the only legitimate rules for
measuring accuracy. This idea is crucial to the veritistic consequentialist research
programme. In particular, SPSR are essential to various vindications of Bayesian norms of
rationality, such as Probabilism (Joyce 1998, 2009; Pettigrew 2016, chap. 7),
Conditionalization (Greaves and Wallace 2007, Pettigrew 2016, chaps. 14-15), the Principal
6 See Joyce (2009, 269). These properties roughly reflect his notion of Truth-Directedness. See also
Pettigrew (2016, 47-60) on related notions.
5 See Brier (1950). See Bickel (2007) and Gneiting and Rafterty (2007) for comparisons among strictly
proper scoring rules.
4 See Joyce (1998; 2009), Greaves and Wallace (2006), and Pettigrew (2016) on scoring rules and
accuracy-centered epistemology. While accuracy-centered epistemology is concerned with credences,
some theories concerned with “full” doxastic states (such as believing, disbelieving and withholding
judgment) also assume that having true beliefs is valuable. See, for instance, Easwaran (2015, 826–28) on
the epistemic value of true beliefs, false beliefs and judgment suspension.
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Principle (Pettigrew 2016, chap. 8), and so forth. Without assuming that legitimate scoring
rules are strictly proper, most of these results are compromised.
Given all this, many veritistic consequentialists are committed to answering our
second question as follows: the epistemic scoring system that best rewards the final
epistemic objective (accuracy) is SPSR. If accuracy is the sole final objective to be
rewarded and SPSR is the only legitimate epistemic scoring system, then SPSR must be the
way to reward accuracy. The problem is that this last claim is far from clear.
 2.2 VEC’s trouble with the second platitude
Consider the following scoring rules:
Liberal Scoring Rule:
Suppose A has a credence of X in P. If P is true, the agent’s score is (1-X)3/2. If P is
false, the agent’s score is X3/2.
Conservative Scoring Rule:
Suppose A has a credence of X in P. If P is true, the agent’s score is (1-X)3. If P is
false, the agent’s score is X3.
As their names suggest, the Liberal Scoring Rule rewards risk-seeking agents, while
the Conservative Scoring Rule rewards risk-averse agents. For example, suppose Sophie
knows that the objective probability that P is 0.7. The Liberal Scoring Rule entails that
assigning a credence of more than 0.7 in P maximizes expected accuracy (in light of her
knowledge of the objective probabilities). By contrast, the Conservative Scoring Rule
entails that assigning a credence of less than 0.7 in P maximizes expected accuracy (again,
in light of her knowledge of the objective probabilities). The Brier Score recommends
assigning a credence of exactly 0.7 in P in terms of expected accuracy.
The above scoring rules have the same properties we just discussed. They concur
that perfectly omniscient agents get the best possible score, that maximally inaccurate
agents get the worst possible score, and that, all things being equal, agents who raise their
credence in a true proposition get a better score. This means that, along with SPSR, they
reward closeness to perfectly accurate credence functions. So, why not think that, in some
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contexts, risk-seeking or risk-aversion should be rewarded? Perhaps preachers and stock
brokers are epistemically permitted to be risk-seeking, while doctors and engineers are
epistemically permitted to be risk-averse. Why not allow for reward structures that match
these possibilities?
Think of the discussion, in Section 1, on scoring rules used in education. For
education specialists, scoring rules reward accuracy. However, we can reward accuracy in
different ways, in accordance with different risk profiles. In some contexts, guessing should
be discouraged, and in others, it should be encouraged. Someone valuing accuracy can say
the same thing. Depending on the context, different risk profiles can be rewarded. The mere
goal of accuracy does not rule out this possibility. It is compatible with a plurality of
legitimate scoring systems, including the ones that are not strictly proper. If we take the
lessons from education seriously, we should not rule out this possibility.
In summary, VEC runs into trouble when answering the following question: Why
think that only SPSR are legitimate inaccuracy measures? VEC is committed to SPSR
being the only legitimate system of epistemic scoring, yet other systems like the liberal and
conservative scoring rules also reward accuracy. Our contention is that, if we take seriously
the idea that scoring rules are functions that reward valuable objectives, then truth monism
about epistemic value doesn’t necessarily entail that all epistemic scoring rules are strictly
proper. It is too weak to rule out other scoring rules.7
2.3 Is the education analogy misleading?
Before moving on, we consider a possible worry with what we have said so far. Doing so
will help clarify our claim and rule out a possible confusion. One might object that our
analogy between epistemic scoring rules and scoring systems in education is misleading on
the following grounds: When they think about scoring methods, education specialists are
not concerned with determining what it is to be accurate on a test. Rather, they are
7 And of course, perhaps only SPSR are legitimate inaccuracy measures. But then, the lesson would
be that we should reject veritistic value monism.
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concerned with finding a scoring method that will best reveal a student’s knowledge. And
these are fairly different things.
More precisely, the objection could be stated as follows: It may be true that there are
many ways to measure how we can reveal one’s knowledge, but this is not what veritistic
consequentialists seek to measure. For them, the issue is not to find a scoring method that
best reveals one’s knowledge or, more relevantly, one’s credences. Instead, the issue is to
measure how accurate one’s credences are. This is different from the issue of determining
what’s in people’s head, as it were. So, the analogy between educational scoring and
epistemic scoring is misleading. The fact that there are many ways to measure one’s
knowledge does not entail that there are many ways to be accurate.8
To respond, we need to start with a clarification. The question we are concerned
with is not “what is it to be accurate?”. We know, for instance, that having a credence of 0.8
in a true proposition is more accurate than having a credence of 0.7 in the same true
proposition. This is a fact about the nature of accuracy. Rather, the question we are
concerned with is this: How should we score credences with respect to accuracy? And our
point is that accuracy alone underdetermines the choice between scoring systems. Even if
we agree that accuracy is the fundamental aim, and even if we agree on what it is to be
accurate, this does not fully settle the question of which scoring system we should choose.
And this is where the analogy with scoring rules in education is helpful. In an
education setting, we can hold fixed the knowledge that the student really has. We can
assume, in other words, that there’s an objective fact about that. But that fact alone is not
enough to settle the choice between different scoring systems. In order to select one scoring
system over another, we must make various choices, and accuracy underdetermines these
choices. Additional aims guide these choices. The same goes with accuracy and scoring
systems for credences. Accuracy alone underdetermines the choice between various scoring
8 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this worry.
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systems. To pick one system rather than another, we must make various choices, and the
fundamental criterion of the credence’s accuracy is neutral about these choices.
 3. Veritism and Arguments For Strict Propriety
In the previous section, we have argued that veritism is compatible with scoring rules that
are not strictly proper. In this section, we confirm this by analyzing three prominent
epistemic arguments for strict propriety. We argue that they all violate veritistic monism
(Note: Some of our objections are not new. But in order to provide a comprehensive
overview of the issue, we present them anyway).
 3.1. Order-Sensitivity
An initial motivation in favour of strictly proper scoring rules comes from
D’Agostino and Sinigaglia (2010). They think that scoring rules should satisfy what they
call Order-Sensitivity. In order to understand Order-Sensitivity, consider the following case:
x y y'
E1 0.3 0.6 0.9
E2 0.6 0.9 0.6
E1 and E2 are propositions, and x, y and y' are judgments concerning E1 and E2. For
instance, x thinks that there is a 30% chance that E1, and that there is a 60% chance that E2.
The difference between y and y' is that their credences in E1 and E2 are “swapped”: the
order of their credences in E1 and E2 is reversed.
D’Agostino and Sinigaglia think that the distance between x and y is greater than
the distance between x and y'. The reason for this, they argue, is that x and y agree
qualitatively on their judgments concerning E1 and E2. That is, x and y concur that E2 is
more likely than E1. They say:
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It seems natural to judge that the distance between x and y' be greater than the
distance between x and y: for x and y agree qualitatively on the degree of
belief they assign to the events E1 and E2, since they both express a higher
degree of belief in E2 than in E1, and so any inversion of this qualitative
judgement – as in y' – must be regarded as increasing the distance between the
belief-vectors; intuitively, y' disagrees with x more than y. Moreover, it seems
reasonable to assume that the additional distance between y' and x grows
monotonically with the difference between the inverted values (0.3 in this
example). This also appears to be intuitively sound (D’Agostino and Sinigaglia
2010, 101).
Not all scoring rules would say that the distance between x and y is less than the distance
between x and y'. For instance, the absolute distance between x and y is the same as the
absolute distance between x and y'. When a scoring rule says that y is closer to x than y', it
is sensitive to the qualitative agreement between x and y. In short: These scoring rules
satisfy what D’Agostino and Sinigaglia call Order-Sensitivity.9
D’Agostino and Sinigaglia think that Order-Sensitivity is a legitimate constraint on
scoring rules. A good scoring rule measuring the accuracy of our credences should satisfy
it. And when combined with other common assumptions, it excludes scoring rules that are10
not strictly proper (see, e.g., D’Agostino and Dardadoni 2009). Thus, Order-Sensitivity is a
crucial step in D’Agostino and Sinigaglia’s vindication of SPSR.
Does this argument vindicate strict propriety? And more importantly, is their
argument compatible with thinking that strictly proper scoring rules reward accuracy along
with something else? First, note that D’Agostino and Sinigaglia’s argument relies primarily
on intuitions. For them, it is intuitive to regard the distance between x and y' as greater than
the distance between x and y. However, there are other intuitions that conflict with SPSR.
For instance, consider the following case:
10 The assumptions and properties are: One-Dimensional Value-Sensitivity, Sub-vector Consistency,
Permutation Invariance and Replication Invariance. See D’Agostino and Sinigaglia (2010, 100-4).
9 See D’Agostino and Sinigaglia (2010, 102)  for a formal definition of Order-Sensitivity.
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x z z'
E1 1 0.6 1
E2 1 0.5 1
E3 1 0.4 0.10
Suppose x is the infallible prediction. For instance, x assigns the most accurate credence in
E1, E2, and E3. It is intuitive to regard z' as more accurate than z (at least, we find it
intuitive to regard z' as more accurate than z, and people around us too). If z and z' were
two competing weather channels, we would watch z'. However, this intuitive reaction
conflicts with some plausible strictly proper scoring rules. For instance, relative to the Brier
score, z gets a better score than z'.11
Intuitions concerning the accuracy of judgments and predictions can point in many
different directions. Some of our intuitions may favour SPSR, but other intuitions may
favour alternatives to SPSR. Here, the lesson is either one of two things: (i) In these
debates, we have various intuitions that point in different directions, and thus are not a
reliable guide, or (ii) provided that our intuitions are a reliable guide, we have a reason to
think that there are legitimate alternatives to SPSR (since some of our intuitions conflict
with SPSR).
Second, even if our intuitions were reliable and favoured Order-Sensitivity, we
would still lack a reason to think that accuracy alone explains this. Suppose, in accordance
with D’Agostino and Sinigaglia, that we regard y as closer to x than y'. How can we explain
this? Perhaps our intuitions are best explained by dispositions or preferences that go beyond
the mere goal of accuracy. That is, not only accuracy should be rewarded, but also some
specific ways to be accurate.
11 Relative to the Brier score, the predictions made by z get a total score of 0.77, while the predictions made
by z' get a total score of 0.81.  And recall that agents are trying to minimize their Brier score.
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Recall that the absolute distance between x and y is “less extreme” (i.e., less close to
values of 0 and 1) than the distance between x and y':
x y y' Absolute distance
between y and x
Absolute distance
between y' and x
E1 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.3 0
E2 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.6
Given this, the reason why our intuitions favour Order-Sensitivity could be that, all things
being equal, we wish to avoid extreme (absolute) distances. That is, provided that x is a
reference point for accuracy (i.e., that being closer to x is being more accurate), our
intuitions suggest that it is better to have two moderately inaccurate attitudes in E1 and E2
than one perfectly accurate attitude in E2 and one highly inaccurate attitude in E2. In other
words, in addition to valuing accuracy, we also value certain ways to be accurate. Those
who think that y is closer to x than y' give more importance to the goal of avoiding
inaccurate credences than to the goal of having accurate credences. So, D’Agostino and
Sinigaglia’s argument is compatible with thinking that veritistic consequentialism does not
vindicate SPSR on its own. The putative reasons why we favour Order-Sensitivity could go
beyond mere accuracy.12
 3.2. Immodesty
According to Gibbard (2008) and Joyce (2009), the credences warranted by scoring
rules must be compatible with some facts about epistemic rationality. Specifically, the
credences warranted by scoring rules should not conflict with the immodesty requirement.
Joyce writes:
Modest credences, it can be argued, are epistemically defective because they
undermine their own adoption and use.... If, relative to a person’s own
credences, some alternative system of beliefs has a lower expected epistemic
12 We thank an anonymous referee for inviting us to discuss this argument.
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disutility, then, by her own estimation, that system is preferable from the
epistemic perspective. This puts her in an untenable doxastic situation…. This
is a probabilistic version of Moore’s Paradox. (Joyce 2009, 277)
Joyce here claims that rational agents are immodest, in the sense that they take their
own credences and standards to be among the most accurate (or truth-conducive) ones
available to them. The requirement of immodesty is a requirement of coherence in the
broad sense. It governs the relationship between an agent’s doxastic states and her beliefs
concerning such states (see also Lewis 1971 and Elga 2010).
It is incoherent for agents to be modest. If one thinks that some doxastic states or
standards are epistemically superior, one should feel some pressure to change one’s
doxastic states and standards. Entertaining doxastic states and standards that one takes to be
less than optimal entails some sort of incoherence or self-distrust. In view of the foregoing,
many philosophers think that agents are epistemically required to be immodest. Relatedly,13
many recent philosophical arguments presuppose that agents are epistemically required to
be immodest.14
Immodesty is used to rule out scoring rules that are not strictly proper. Joyce15
writes:
Some credences do seem uncontroversially rational, and so... [we can] rule out
various candidate scoring rules. Consider the exponential scores with z≠2 [like
the liberal or the conservative scoring rules].... Normally, it seems fine to align
15 Along with other assumptions and principles. For instance, Joyce’s vindication assumes that the Principal
Principle is correct. This principle says that an epistemically rational agent’s credence ought to reflect his
or her knowledge of the objective probabilities. Combining Immodesty, the Principal Principle and other
common assumptions leads to strict propriety. However, Hájek (2009, 247-9) raises some worries
concerning the recourse to the Principal Principle in Joyce’s argument. Among other things, Hájek is
worried that there can be conflicts between the Principal Principle and what Joyce calls Minimal
Coherence.
14 For more on this issue, see e.g., Hedden (2015), Horowitz (2014), Schoenfield (2014), and Li (2016,
9–10).
13 Lewis (1971) and Elga (2010) suggest that modest methods or standards cannot be completely trusted,
and thus display a kind of internal failure. See also Hedden (2015), Horowitz (2014) and Schoenfield
(2014). Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) argue that, in order to accommodate scoring rules for
imprecise credences, immodesty ought to be replaced with a weaker principle.
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one’s credences for the tosses of a fair die with the uniform probability over the
six sides. However, with the exception of the Brier score, all exponential scores
make such credences modest. (Joyce 2009, 278)
Very roughly, Joyce uses immodesty, a coherence requirement (or, more
specifically, a requirement prohibiting self-distrust), as a constraint on available scoring
rules. The liberal scoring or the conservative scoring rule could make it modest, for an
agent, to entertain credences that are clearly permissible or required. Joyce thinks this is
problematic. So, he excludes them on this ground—that is, these scoring rules are ruled out
because they make it incoherent, for agents, to have some permissible credences. Hence,
immodesty is used as a constraint on legitimate scoring rules.
However, there are known worries concerning the claim that agents fall under an
obligation to be immodest. For instance, according to Christensen, (2013), epistemic
modesty can be permitted in cases where various epistemic ideals (e.g., ideals of coherence,
good reasoning and evidence-responsiveness) conflict with each other. Relatedly, DiPaolo
(2018) and Daoust (2020) argue that modesty can be part of the best non-ideal option
available to agents.
Also, why might veritists want to reward immodesty and, more generally,
coherence? Joyce may be right that being immodest is epistemically valuable. Perhaps
self-trust, or coherence more generally, is epistemically valuable. But if VEC’s value
monism is right, then it can only be epistemically valuable for the sake of the sole final
epistemic value of accuracy. Given veritism, self-trust and coherence can be epistemically
good only insofar as it promotes accuracy. So, veritists should want their scoring system to
reward immodesty, self-trust or coherence just in case doing so were instrumental to
rewarding accuracy.
But this does not seem to be Joyce’s story. Immodesty and coherence are presented
as worth rewarding not because they promote accuracy, but because they are epistemically
good in their own right; because they are clear requirements of epistemic rationality and we
do not want to reward epistemic irrationality. So, the justification is not that rewarding
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immodesty is necessary to reward accuracy, but rather that it is necessary to avoid
rewarding incoherent credences. This suggests a value-pluralistic story according to which
the goals we need to reward include not only accuracy, but also coherence or self-trust.16
Here are two replies to this worry. First, perhaps we can use requirements like
immodesty to figure out the nature of inaccuracy measures. For instance, immodesty could
be used in an inference to the best explanation pertaining to inaccuracy measures, as in the
following:17
(P1) Measuring inaccuracy with SPSR allow rational agents to take the rational
credence in P and be immodest;
(P2) Measuring inaccuracy with alternatives to SPSR can put rational agents in a
difficult position: If they take the rational credence in P, they could have to be
modest about their credence in P.
(P3) The best explanation of (P1) and (P2) is that inaccuracy is measured with
SPSR.
(C) So, inaccuracy is measured with SPSR.
However, even if we assume that this type of reasoning carries weight, there is an
explanatory gap between (P1)-(P2) and (P3). That alternatives to SPSR create problems for
rational agents should lead us to infer something about the relationship between rationality
and scoring rules. A weaker inference from (P1)-(P2) is this:
(P3)* The best explanation of (P1) and (P2) is that, if agents value rationality, then
they measure inaccuracy with SPSR.
17 There are similar strategies in print. Horowitz (2014), for instance, is concerned with the
relationship between Immodesty and permissivism. That is, she tries to figure out whether uniqueness best
explains Immodesty. We thank a referee for inviting us to discuss this point.
16 There could, of course, be veritistic justifications of immodesty. But these putative vindications are
unheard of. Here, we limit ourselves to the known justification for immodesty, based on coherence and
self-trust. Should new justifications be offered for this requirement, we will be able to analyze them.
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(C)* So, if agents value rationality, they measure inaccuracy with SPSR.
(C)* is compatible with our argument. Traditionally, there are different dimensions
associated with rationality: reason correctly, avoid incoherent combinations of attitudes,18 19
form and revise attitudes in accordance with your evidence, optimize expected utility or20
accuracy, etc. In (C)*, SPSR could be a consequence of dimensions of rationality that are21
tangential to accuracy. For instance, the reason why rational agents measure inaccuracy
with SPSR could be that rationality rewards accuracy and coherence. Once again, we lack a
reason to think that accuracy on its own justifies SPSR.
Second, one could reply that this story is still compatible with veritism since
rewarding coherence (or self-trust) is, in fact, necessary to reward accuracy. For instance,22
perhaps requirements of coherence are explained away by other requirements, such as
maximizing expected accuracy. If this is right, then appeals to immodesty would remain
true to veritism.
But this alleged relationship between accuracy and coherence is contentious. There
is growing concern that coherence is not a necessary condition of various epistemic norms
and goals. Some philosophers have argued that coherence can conflict with
evidence-responsiveness (Worsnip 2018; Lasonen-Aarnio 2018; Coates 2012) and some
substantive rational requirements (see, e.g., Kiesewetter 2017, 254, 258). So, coherence is
not entailed by various epistemic norms.
What about norms of (expected) accuracy? In the literature on veritistic norms for
full belief, many philosophers have argued that coherence and the maximization of
expected accuracy can come apart. Just think of the Lockean consequentialist picture of full
22 We take modesty to be a species of incoherence, namely, self-distrust. See, e.g., DiPaolo (2018),
Elga (2010) and Schechter (2013).
21 See, e.g., Wedgwood (2017). But Wedgwood refers to correctness instead of accuracy.
20 See, e.g., Kiesewetter (2017), Lord (2018). Kiesewetter and Lord refer to epistemic reasons, not
evidence. But Kiesewetter thinks that one’s reasons are “evidence-relative.”
19 See, e.g., Broome (2013, chap. 8-9), Worsnip (2018).
18 See, e.g., Broome (2013, chaps. 12-16).
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belief. For Lockean consequentialists, the maximization of expected accuracy sometimes23
entails that, while an agent maximizes expected accuracy in believing P1, P2,..., Pn, he or she
maximizes expected accuracy in disbelieving the conjunction (P1, P2,..., Pn). In technical
terms, maximizing expected accuracy is sometimes incompatible with closure principles.
Beliefs that are not closed under conjunction cannot be true simultaneously, and thus
display a kind of incoherence. So, expected accuracy maximizers are not necessarily24
coherent.
Now, perhaps the Lockean consequentialist picture of belief is false. This example
is simply meant to show that some expected accuracy principles can conflict with
coherence principles. So, the claim that rewarding coherence is necessary to reward
accuracy cannot be taken for granted. It is a live possibility that coherence can conflict with
maximizing (expected) accuracy.
 3.3. Calibration and Decomposition
Another justification for VEC’s epistemic scoring monism—for the claim that SPSR are the
only legitimate inaccuracy measures—relies on calibration, and comes from Pettigrew
(2016, sec. 4.3). Pettigrew begins by quoting Ramsey, who says:
Granting that [an agent] is going to think always in the same way about all
yellow toadstools, we can ask what degree of confidence it would be best for
him to have that they are unwholesome. And the answer is that it will in general
be best for his degree of belief that a yellow toadstool is unwholesome to be
equal to the proportion of yellow toadstools that are unwholesome. (Ramsey
1931, 195)
Pettigrew then analyzes the meaning of “best” in Ramsey’s quote. In what sense is it “best”
to proportionate one’s credences in “a yellow toadstool is unwholesome” to the observed
frequencies (e.g., the observed proportion of yellow toadstools that are unwholesome)?
24 This is a common observation in the literature on the lottery paradox. See, e.g., Nelkin (2000) and
Hawthorne and Bovens (1999).
23 See Dorst (2017) and Easwaran (2015).
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Surely, epistemically speaking, an agent would be better off if he or she predicted perfectly
which yellow toadstools are wholesome and which are not (Pettigrew 2016, 58).
However, there is a different sense in which it would be “best” to proportionate
one’s credence to the observed frequencies. The difference can be explained in terms of
reference class. If each individual toadstool has its own reference class, then the observed
frequencies and the perfect credence function will coincide. But if a reference class
contains many yellow toadstools, it could be ideal for an agent to proportionate one's
credences to the observed frequencies in this reference class. As Pettigrew says, “on
Ramsey’s account, the ideal credence function depends on the reference classes into which
we partition the set F of propositions to which the agent assigns credences.” (Ibid., 58) In
other words, with respect to a reference class, one’s credences should be calibrated.
Pettigrew thinks that legitimate scoring rules should satisfy calibration. He wishes25
to make sense of the intuition that “credences are better the closer they are to being well
calibrated.” (Ibid., 63) When combined with other desiderata on legitimate scoring rules ,26
we get the result that only SPSR are legitimate. (Ibid., 65-66)
But just like the arguments from order-sensitivity and immodesty, this appeal to
calibration does not remain faithful to veritistic value monism. To see this, consider
Pettigrew’s response to the following objection against calibration. Suppose Bonnie and
Clyde know that 50% of the toadstools in their garden are wholesome. There are two
mushrooms in their garden: C1 and C2. They both think that only C1 and C2 are part of the
relevant partition class. As it happens, C1 is wholesome, and C2 is not. Bonnie has a
credence of 0.5 in “C1 is wholesome” and a credence of 0.5 in “C2 is wholesome.” Clyde
has a credence of 0.9 in “C1 is wholesome” and a credence of 0.2 in “C2 is wholesome.”
Bonnie has calibrated credences, while Clyde doesn't. However, Clyde’s credences are
26 These other desiderata are Alethic Vindication, Perfectionism, and Continuity, and Additivity. See
Pettigrew (2016, 47-60).
25 Or, more specifically, Decomposition (Ibid., 63)
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more accurate. So, we are faced with a problem: Calibration seems, on some occasions, to
conflict with truth-directedness. If we merely want to reward accuracy, we should not
necessarily reward calibration.
Pettigrew replies that calibration offers a specific interpretation of how we should
pursue accuracy. Agents primarily want to be accurate, but they may only pursue this goal
by satisfying calibration. He thinks that both desiderata (calibration and accuracy) do not
necessarily conflict with each other, because we can evaluate an agent’s calibrated credence
function by its proximity to the perfectly accurate credence function. He says:
We might preserve the intuition behind calibrationism and the intuition behind
truth-directedness by saying that the accuracy of a credence function at a world
is partly determined by its proximity to its well calibrated counterpart, but
partly by the proximity of its well calibrated counterpart to the omniscient
credence function. This retains both intuitions: the truth-directedness intuition
is that proximity to the omniscient credence function is important; the
calibrationist intuition is that proximity to the well calibrated counterpart is
important. (Ibid., 63)
To say this, however, is to make an epistemic value claim that does not trace back to the
final value of accuracy. As Pettigrew notes himself, calibration accuracy is logically
stronger than accuracy tout court (Ibid., 63). If all we care about is accuracy, we have no
particular reason to prefer the stronger interpretation of accuracy in terms of calibration.
To be clear: epistemically speaking, rewarding calibration can make perfect sense.
And perhaps we have strong intuitions in favour of calibration. Our contention is that
invoking the need to reward this desideratum goes against veritistic monism. Calibration is
a secondary objective that restricts how we should pursue accuracy. Some veritists might
not want to reward calibration.
Compare with an example discussed in Section 1: We want doctors to be accurate.
However, we don’t want them to guess. This is why, when training doctors, we go for
scoring rules that reward risk-averse accuracy. These scoring rules reward two objectives:
accuracy and risk-aversion (or whatever final goal is promoted by doctors’ being
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risk-averse). Similarly, Pettigrew is looking for a scoring rule that rewards accuracy, but
also penalizes agents when they violate calibration. This is why Pettigrew goes for
calibration accuracy. But again, this simply means that scoring rules should reward two
objectives: accuracy and calibration (or whatever final goal is promoted by calibrating).
Talk of “risk-averse accuracy” is similar to talk of “calibration accuracy”: In both cases,
this simply means that two independent objectives are rewarded. In both cases, we wish to
reward accuracy along with something else.27
 3.4. Taking Stock
We have examined three prominent arguments, from proponents of VEC, for SPSR being
the only legitimate epistemic scoring system. We have argued that those justifications of
SPSR conflict with veritistic monism.
As we have seen at the outset, which scoring system(s) we should choose depends
on which value(s) we aim to reward. VEC is committed to accuracy being the only
epistemic goal to be rewarded for its own sake. Any other epistemic goal should be
rewarded just in case it is necessary to reward accuracy. The problem is that the arguments
for SPSR-based monism invoke the need to reward goals that are not only distinct, but also
independent from accuracy.
To be clear: It is an interesting phenomenon that many different desiderata converge
towards strict propriety. But none of the above arguments show that, if we merely care
about accuracy, there cannot be, in some contexts, legitimate reward structures for
risk-seeking or risk-averse agents. These arguments suggest that strict propriety makes
27 Note that this worry is not entirely new. Levinstein (2017b, sec. 2.3) has argued that Pettigrew’s
commitment to calibration can interpreted in two ways: either (i) he endorses some sort of epistemic
value pluralism, or (ii) he does not remain faithful to the desideratum of truth-directedness (by
introducing a constraint that is outside the scope of truth-directedness). In response to Levinstein’s
argument, Pettigrew reiterates that calibration acts as a secondary goal, and provides a specific
interpretation of how to pursue the goal of accuracy (Pettigrew 2017, 11). This responds to the second
interpretation proposed by Levinstein, namely, (ii). But Pettigrew’s response is compatible with (i),
namely, epistemic value pluralism. If, on top of accuracy, we wish to reward an independent secondary
objective, we must assume that it is valuable independently of accuracy.
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sense in many contexts, but they do not rule out the possibility of “local” alternatives to
strictly proper scoring rules.
 4. Levinstein’s Pragmatist Vindication of SPSR
The vindications of SPSR-based monism we have seen so far have been epistemic
in character. They invoked a scoring rule’s capacity to reward goals that are recognizably
epistemic. This, however, was part of the problem. Those epistemic vindications did not
trace back to the need to reward accuracy, thereby undermining VEC’s other monistic thesis
that views accuracy as the sole final epistemic value.
In light of this, could veritists instead invoke pragmatic reasons for excluding
non-SPSR? This could be a promising strategy since it might allow VEC to justify its
SPSR-based monism without invoking any other epistemic goal besides accuracy, thereby
leaving its epistemic value monism unaffected. After all, the claim that accuracy is the sole
final epistemic value is compatible with the existence of non-epistemic final values.
One recent example of this kind of strategy comes from Benjamin Levinstein
(2017). According to him, we can derive SPSR from pragmatic concerns (or from the
assumption that the epistemic value of accuracy is grounded in practical value).
In the remainder of this section, we analyze his argument, and identify some of its
limits.
 4.1. Pragmatism and Veritism
Levinstein is a pragmatist, in the sense that he takes all value to be related to practical
success. Yet, he thinks that accuracy has final epistemic value. Some might think that these
views are inconsistent with each other. Let us clarify how one can be a pragmatist and also
a veritist about epistemic value.
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There are many domains that imply standards or norms. In addition to epistemic
norms, there are also norms associated with morality, prudence, fashion, etiquette, finance,
tradition, games, etc. Not all of those domains are equally important, of course. But they all
set standards relative to which certain behaviours count as permitted, forbidden, obligatory,
correct, incorrect, good, bad, and so on.
Veritists think that accuracy (or truth) has final epistemic value. Minimally, this
means that, relative to the epistemic domain, accuracy is valuable. But this is compatible
with saying that there is a more general domain, like the practical one, from which all the
relevant domain-relative values are derived. This is Levinstein’s view. He thinks that all
domain-relative values that matter can be derived from a concern for practical success.
Whether something has epistemic value depends on whether it ultimately promotes
accuracy. But whether we ought to promote epistemic value depends, ultimately, on
whether doing so would promote practical value. Such a pragmatist might then argue that
epistemic value is worth promoting because doing so is, in general, necessary for practical
success. As Levinstein writes, “we are in agreement with the pure epistemic utility theorist
that the only epistemic good is accuracy. ... We simply disagree about the ultimate source of
this value” (Levinstein 2017, 615).
So, the reason we address Levinstein’s argument is that he thinks, in accordance
with veritistic consequentialism, that accuracy has final epistemic value. However, he
thinks that we can explain the epistemic value of accuracy in terms of practical goals. And
perhaps taking a closer look at these practical goals can tell us why epistemic scoring rules
are strictly proper.
 4.2. A Brief Summary of Levinstein’s Argument
In this section, we briefly present Levinstein’s argument for strictly proper scoring rules.
First pass: Levinstein starts by assuming that rational agents will try to minimize
their expected losses (2017, 622, 624). In decision theory, we are familiar with cases where
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an agent’s evaluation of the expectancies will depend on her credence in various events. For
instance, if your credence in the proposition “it will rain today” is low, you will probably
judge that not bringing your umbrella to work will maximize expected utility. By way of
contrast, if your credence in the proposition “it will rain” goes up, this might affect your
judgment that not bringing your umbrella to work will maximize expected utility. This is
so, because the expected utility of bringing an umbrella to work will be higher. So, having
accurate credences often has practical implications.
In technical terms, we could say that if agents have accurate credences, they are
more likely to be on the right side of the cutoff (ibid., 626, 628). A cutoff is a credence q in
P over which an agent will perform an action (that maximizes expected utility). Being on
the right side of the cutoff means performing the best action. For instance:
 Suppose it will rain tomorrow. If Alice has a credence of more than 0.6 in “it will rain
tomorrow,” she will bring her umbrella. Then, 0.6 is the cutoff, and Alice will be on the
right side of the cutoff if she has a credence of more than 0.6 in “it will rain tomorrow”
(on this side of the cutoff, she will bring her umbrella). Higher credences in the
proposition “it will rain tomorrow” are more likely to put Alice on the right side of the
cutoff. Given that it will rain tomorrow, raising her degree of confidence in this
proposition increases her accuracy. So, accuracy makes it more likely that she will be
on the right side of the cutoff.
 Suppose it will not rain tomorrow. Then, Alice will be on the right side of the cutoff if
she has a credence of less than 0.6 in “it will rain tomorrow.” Again, accuracy makes it
more likely that she will be on the right side of the cutoff.
Naturally, perfectly accurate agents would always make decisions that are on the right side
of the cutoff.
Second pass: Given that agents want to minimize expected disutility (or maximize
expected utility), accurate credences are useful when they are relevant to problems that
have a cutoff (Levinstein calls them “q-problems”). Accordingly, we can determine the
– 26 –
expected utility of having accurate credences. Since we want to minimize the expected loss,
we need to know both “how high the stakes are expected to be given that a q-problem is
faced and how likely Alice thinks it is that she will face a q-problem” (ibid., 629).28
This, of course, presupposes that the cutoff (i.e., the credence q) is known. We do
not always know this. For generality, Levinstein assumes that an agent could face a
q-problem, where q∈[0,1]. Then, what will matter in such a case is the probability density
of facing a q-problem multiplied by the expected stakes associated with that problem.29
Final pass: Then, Levinstein argues that, since rational agents try to minimize their
expected losses, they measure the inaccuracy of their credences with strictly proper scoring
rules. His strategy is based on Schervish’s representation theorem. Very roughly, he argues
that if the function of probability density of facing a q-problem multiplied by the expected
stakes associated with that problem is strictly positive almost everywhere (e.g., not always30
zero), then the loss function that returns how much A will gain (or lose) given A’s choice of
credences will be strictly proper. See Levinstein (2017, 630) and Schervish (1989) for
details. In other words, given our practical reasons to value accuracy, it should be measured
with strictly proper scoring rules.
 4.3. Two Worries with Levinstein’s Argument
We grant that Levinstein’s argument can apply to many situations. However, this is not
enough to show that an agent’s level of inaccuracy must always be measured with SPSR.
First, Levinstein focuses on cases where accuracy is a means for being on the right
side of the cutoff. As discussed in Section 4.2, a cutoff is a credence q in a proposition P
over which an agent will perform an action (that maximizes expected utility). Agents are on
the right side of the cutoff when their decision is optimal.
30 Formally: The function given by p(q)·E(W|q). See the previous footnotes.
29 Formally: Agents want to optimize the function given by p(q)·E(W|q). See (ibid.).
28 Formally: Agents want to optimize the function given by E(W|q)·Pr(q). See (ibid., 629).
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In most cases, accuracy is instrumental for making the best decision (or being on the
right side of the cutoff). However, there are cases in which this assumption is not true.
Suppose that Alice is very sick. She would be greatly comforted by the thought that she
will survive. Perhaps it is very unlikely that she will survive. So, having an inaccurate
credence in the proposition “I will survive” is the best decision she can make. Note that
Alice’s degree of inaccuracy in the proposition “I will survive” doesn’t make it more likely
that she will be on the wrong side of the cutoff. She will find comfort in thinking that she
will survive, no matter how inaccurate this credence is.
Insofar as accuracy is conducive of good decisions, Levinstein’s argument is
plausible, and strict propriety makes sense. But the argument does not generalize to the (not
uncommon) cases in which accuracy is independent of good decisions, i.e. cases in which
accuracy would lead to bad decisions or where inaccuracy would lead to good decisions.
Accordingly, Levinstein’s pragmatist vindication of SPSR does not apply to cases in which
having inaccurate doxastic states serves an agent’s goals. This is compatible with there
being some contexts in which an agent’s inaccuracy could be measured with scoring rules
that are not strictly proper.
In addition to detrimental truths and useful falsehoods, the possibility of practically
pointless or trivial truths is a problem for Levinstein’s argument. The kind of true belief (or
accurate credence) we here have in mind is about a subject-matter or topic that has
absolutely no connection to your practical life. It is about a topic that is utterly irrelevant
and unrelated to any of your pragmatic goods. Think of topics like what goes on in some
nearly empty corner of the universe, the lives of some insect from the distant past, and the
like. The best examples of pointless truths are also extremely complex, detailed, and
precise. As Marian David points out:
‘[A]ll truths’ comprises not only each and every trivial truth of the ‘how many
threads in my carpet’-variety, but also every conjunction of every two truths I
already believe (trivial or non-trivial), including, of course, complex
conjunctions whose conjuncts are themselves conjunctions of truths I already
believe (trivial or non-trivial); it also comprises every disjunction of (trivial or
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non-trivial) truths I already believe with any propositions you like; and lots of
other redundant ‘garbage’ of this sort. (David 2005, 296–98)
Some true beliefs are not just about irrelevant matters, they are also about highly
complex propositions that logically connect any number of those countless irrelevant
beliefs we can form. At first sight, there is no reason to think that having accurate doxastic
states in these propositions is practically valuable.31
Levinstein’s argument doesn’t generalize well to pointless truths. Take the following
example. What do you get when you take the number of blades of grass in the eight largest
parks in Belarus at 10:55pm on October 1st, 2011 and divide it by the number of hairs on
the left arm of the second oldest orangutan at the London zoo in 1993? There is a truth
about that, but it is hard to see what practical value there could be in believing it. It is
patently clear that there is nothing at stake in having a true belief in this proposition.
One natural objection is that even those obscure complex beliefs are worth
promoting, practically, because they could, in principle, turn out to be useful down the line.
We never know whether an accurate credence in P (or a true belief in P) will be useful to us
in the future (Levinstein 2017, sec. 3.5).
However, we can imagine cases in which we know that an accurate credence in P is
pointless. Suppose you know for sure that you will die in the next 10 seconds or that your
recent memory and beliefs will be wiped out. You can’t record any information and you
can’t communicate with anyone. Perhaps you jumped off a plane without a parachute naked
in the middle of Antarctica while ingesting a high dose of deadly poison. Before dying, you
31 Note that our argument commits us only to the existence of practically pointless truths, i.e., true
propositions such that believing them would not promote any practical value such as the well-being of
the believer’s or of others in the believer’s community. We do not need the closely related, but stronger
claim that some truths are such that believing them would not promote any genuine value, not even
non-practical value. For instance, what we say is compatible with the claim that although some true
beliefs are practically pointless, they are worth having because every true belief is valuable for its own
sake (just in virtue of being true). So, all we are saying is that whether or not true belief itself is a
(non-practical) final good, it is not necessarily valuable for the sake of some practical good. For more on
this issue, see Lynch (2004), David (2005), Kvanvig (2008), Hazlett (2013), Whiting (2013), Wrenn
(2017), and Côté-Bouchard (2017).
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could acquire an accurate credence concerning the number of giant sequoias in Muir
Woods. You really don’t care about sequoias. Moreover, you know that an accurate
credence in “there is an even number of giant sequoias in Muir Woods” won’t satisfy your
sense of curiosity, won’t stimulate your intellect, won’t help you reach new interesting
conclusions, won’t be useful to the members of your epistemic community, and so forth.
Plausibly, you know that accuracy concerning the number of giant sequoias in Muir Woods
is pointless for you (given your situation). The upshot is that in some circumstances, you
can come to know that an accurate credence in P is entirely pointless for you.
Now, suppose agents know that an accurate doxastic state in a given proposition is
entirely pointless. Accordingly, there is nothing at stake with having an accurate credence
in this proposition. In Levinstein’s framework, this means that the probability density of32
facing a q-problem multiplied by the expected stakes associated with that problem will be
equal to 0. Why? Because agents know that nothing is at stake, and so, the expected33
stakes are null.
If the function of probability density of facing a q-problem multiplied by the
expected stakes associated with that problem is equal to 0, the final pass of Levinstein’s
argument based on Schervish’s representation theorem doesn’t work. His argument works if
the function is strictly positive almost everywhere. In natural language: The function should
not be equal to 0 everywhere. This condition is violated in cases where a proposition is
entirely pointless. Thus, in cases where agents know that nothing is at stake, or that a
proposition is practically pointless, the pragmatist vindication of SPSR is unsuccessful.
So, at best, Levinstein’s argument provides a partial vindication of SPSR. His
argument is compatible with the claim that, in cases where there are no practical stakes
(e.g., having an inaccurate credence in P won’t matter from a practical point of view), there
are alternatives to SPSR.
33 This is so, because E(W|q) can be conditionalized on W=0. Formally: p(q)·E(W|q, W=0)=0. See
footnotes 23-25 and 27.
32 Given Levinstein’s notation, this amounts to knowing that W=0.
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Levinstein acknowledges that there are pointless propositions. Formally, this
possibility is represented in his framework by W=0. He could even grant that agents can
know that a proposition is pointless. However, he also notes that agents are often uncertain
of the practical stakes associated with having accurate credences in various propositions.
So, in most contexts, agents assume that W can take value 0, but that it could also take
value 2, 10, 100, and so forth. If agents think that W can take another value than 0, the
argument succeeds. Indeed, as Levinstein notes: “if Alice leaves open the possibility
(however remote) of facing any q-problem whatever, then she will use a strictly proper
scoring rule to evaluate her credence.”  (Levinstein 2017, 630)
So, Levinstein could argue that all he needs for his argument to succeed is that
agents are not fully certain that the proposition is practically pointless (i.e., they have a
credence of less than one in “this proposition is practically pointless”). The claim would
then be that rational agents can never have credence 1 that a proposition is pointless.
But going this route would have controversial consequences. For starters, consider
the orthodox Bayesian claim that an agent’s evidence consists in the propositions to which
she assigns credence 1. While some philosophers think that some evidence deserves a34
credence of less than 1, few would argue none of our evidence deserves credence 1. Yet, the
fact that “P is a pointless truth” (for some P) can plausibly be part of one’s evidence. If this
is right, then agents could (often) assign credence 1 in “P is a pointless truth.” This,
however, would be impossible if rational agents could not believe with credence 1 that a
proposition is pointless.
Moreover, our opponent is forced to explain away the many intuitive cases in which
it seems that agents can be rationally certain that a proposition is pointless. Think, for
instance, of the case we discussed above. Suppose you know for sure that you will die in
the next 10 seconds. Given these extreme circumstances, it seems entirely permissible to
34 This follows from the Simple Principle of Conditionalization (Talbott 2016, secs. 2, 6.2.A). This also
follows from any view which says that agents can or should assign credence 0 to propositions that are
inconsistent with their evidence. See, e.g., Williamson (2000, chap. 9) and Titelbaum (2013, 84).
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have credence 1 in “Learning the number of giant sequoias in Muir Woods in the next 10
seconds in practically pointless for me.” If rational agents can have credence 1 in anything,
then it is hard to see why this would not include propositions like this.
All we need for our argument to succeed is that, in some cases, rational agents can
have credence 1 in “P is a pointless truth” (for some P). The burden of proof falls on the
objector to show that it is impossible to have a rational credence 1 in “P is a pointless truth”
(for some P).
 5. Conclusion
Epistemic consequentialists are typically committed to two monistic theses. The
first is a veritistic or accuracy-based form of monism about epistemic value: there is not a
plurality of final epistemic values besides accuracy. The second is a form of monism about
epistemic scoring: there is not a plurality of legitimate systems of epistemic scoring besides
strictly proper scoring rules (SPSR).
We have argued that there is a tension between those two central tenets of VEC.
This tension is revealed once we take seriously the following questions: why view SPSR as
the only legitimate system to measure inaccuracy? In general, the scoring system(s) we
should choose is determined by the objective(s) we want to reward. For veritists, the sole
epistemic objective to be rewarded is accuracy. Hence, they ought to choose epistemic
scoring systems that reward accuracy. But while SPSR do reward accuracy, some
non-SPSR also appear to reward it. So, why should veritists exclude these non-SPSR? We
have examined four prominent answers from proponents of VEC and found all of them
wanting. Therefore, unless epistemic consequentialists come up with a vindication of SPSR
that really does trace back to the need to reward accuracy, then they will have to give up at
least one of their two central monistic commitments. Perhaps SPSR really is the only
legitimate epistemic scoring system, but because mere accuracy is not, in fact, the sole final
epistemic value to be rewarded. Or perhaps accuracy really is the sole final epistemic value,
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but non-SPSR sometimes are legitimate ways of measuring inaccuracy. In any case, this
remains an unresolved tension at the core of the veristic epistemic consequentialist research
programme.
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